Abstract: This paper deals with the group decision making problem, assuming that each individual defines his/her opinion through fuzzy binary preference relations, in parallel to the classical approach due to Prof. Arrow. In particular, it is postulated that the main reason for the discouraging impossibility theorems is neither in the domain of admissible preferences or in the concept of solution (Social Welfare Functions versus Social Decision Functions), but in the underlying idea of rationality under all crisp approaches: non complete irrational aggregations will be possible under a fuzzy approach, in such a way that classical Arrow's theorem should be understood just as an impossibility of getting complete rational aggregations.
INTRODUCTION
As shown by Arrow [l] in his classical impossibility theorem, aggregation of individual preferences into a single social preference represents a difficult task if we want to keep a minimum of ethical rules together with a minimum of rational rules.
In his historical work, it was considered an arbitrary finite group D of -at least two-human beings, expressing their preferences about a finite set X of -at least threefeasible alternatives. The problem was stated on how to reach to a social preference representing all the group as a single individual, and it was assumed that both individual and consensus social opinions were expressed by linear orders, that is, complete, reflexive and transitive binary relations defined on the set X of alternatives. In this context it was proved the impossibility of aggregation rules assigning a social preference ordering to each possible profile of individual preference orderings 3] ) by considering the idea of single-peakedness in order to show how dangerous for a consensus are those crisp individuals with too c l e a r opinions, not inclined anyway to accept other conclusion than their own.
(b) By relaxing the concept of consensus, arguing that the real objective in practice is just some useful decision-oriented information (for example, by considering Sen's Social Decision Functions, which should allow a coherent subset of alternatives that should be analyzed in a second step).
Some positive results have been obtained under both approaches, but even Sen himself recognizes that Arrow's negative philosophy still remains. But though it can be understood that there is no general methodology for aggregating crisp individual preferences, in practice consensus are usually reached, perhaps through a dynamic decision-oriented process, or just making some kind of social pressure against discordant individuals to margin them in such a way that they are in fact excluded from the decision making. Our thesis is that the main difficulty under Arrow's focus is not due to how any ethical condition is formally written or how the social opinion should be expressed, but how the idea of rationality is understood: the underlying Aristotelian concept of rationality based upon any crisp transitivity or c r i s p acyclity, which provokes to think that if something is not absolutely rational, then it is absolutely irrational. In this sense, as pointed out in Montero [5], Lukasievicz's censure to sciences based on using Aristotelian logic is also valid here. Let us consider a given fuzzy preference relation p and let us look for a natural weighting of all acyclic chains of different alternatives: for example, if we take only the alternative x, there is only one acyclic path: XIX which can be weighted by pI(x,x); and if we take two alternatives {x,y), we can find three different acyclic paths: xByWx, yBxWy, xIyIx which can be weighted respectively by In general, a path xl-xz-. . . -xk-x1 of k distinct alternatives will be non-acyclic if and only if XlPX2P. . . PXkPXl with some strict preference or xlPxkP.. .Px2Pxl with some strict preference; in our context, a natural degree of acyclity of a given path can be defined by an addition -through all contained acyclic chains-of products of preference intensities (see Based on those path weights, rationality -that is, acyclity-can be defined as a fuzzy property being R(X) is the family of all complete fuzzy preference relations on X; the value A ( p ) will be the minimum sum of weights of acyclic paths over all possible chains of alternatives:
where G=(x -x -... where we can find -in this order-the sum of acyclic weights for the three chains (x), (y) and ( z ) with only one alternative (in this case we find what we know as crisp reflexivity), the sum of acyclic weights for the three chains (x,y), (y,z) and (z,x) with two alternatives, and the acyclity for the unique chain (x,y,z) with three alternatives. In particular, the path G=(z,x) drops the lowest acyclity A (G), that is, the highest irrationality. cr
Obviously, the number of numerical operations required for the above expression increases exponentially as the number of alternatives grows up. Moreover, in real applications, we can find that some portion of irrationality can be justified just by considering the size of the problem (the higher number of comparisons needed, the lowest acyclity); this structural acyclity should by measured by some ad hoc sensitivity analysis. For example, very long chains fall very easily to the level 0.5 of acyclity (see (1) Unrestricted Domain: such mapping is in fact defined over all popible profiles of complete fuzzy preference relations R (X). for all x,y~X and any (p ,p , . . . ,pi-' ,pi*l, . . . ,p")
The condition of Unrestricted Domain requires a more carefully discussion in order to maintain Arrow's philosophy: when linear orders were associated to each individual and the group itself, it was assumed -from our point of view-that individuals and group were absolutely rational; and this should be the strict consequence of classical Impossibility Theorems: there is no ethical possibility of assuring absolute rationality. From our point of view, such maximum degree of rationality can not be claimed in practical situations, neither for individuals; hence, perhaps some minimums degrees of rationality should be previously defined for the group preference relation and all individual preference relations. A simple approach could be just assume that individuals are not absolutely irrational, and then ask if it is possible to find rules assuring non absolutely irrationality for the group.
According to these last comments, let us denote %(XI = { I I E R ( X ) / A(II)>O) the set of Non-Absolutely Irrational (NAI) complete fuzzy preference relations. A NAI Social Welfare Function will be then given by a mapping satisfying the above conditions (1) to (5), where R n ( X ) and R ( X ) have been replaced, respectively, by @(X) and F(X). Then we can escape from the crisp negative result, since it will be possible to find NAI Social Welfare Functions verifying such ethical rules.Though weak at first sight -it merely implies the absence of absolute irrationality, no matter how close the opinions are to absolute rationalitythis positive result represents a justification for a posterior research looking for the best or a satisfying NAI aggregation rule, perhaps by adding to the model an additional criterion, as some consensus measure (see 
